Although the concepts of security and trust play an important issue in the development of information systems, they have been mainly neglected by software engineering methodologies. In this chapter we present an approach that considers security and trust throughout the software development process. Our approach integrates two prominent software engineering approaches, one that provides a securityoriented process and one that provides a trust management process.
INTRODUCTION
It has been identified in many cases that securing information systems is not only about providing a set of standard security mechanisms such as authentication or confidentiality. Providing adequate security requires the capability of reasoning about security and its related concepts.
Some related concepts, and in particular trust, have been identified by recent research (DeTreville, 2002; Li, 2002; Samarati, 2001) as an important aspect to be considered when reasoning about security. Anderson (2001) has recognised the need to integrate an indepth analysis of security and trust issues during the development of information systems. Such analysis should allow developers not only to model security and trust but also, and most importantly, to reason about these concepts. In other words, securing information systems needs to evolve from a "one fits all" solution, where developers introduce standard security mechanisms such as authentication to various parts of the system without taking into account any interrelation and even conflicts with other requirements of the system, to completed and integrated solutions according to the real security requirements of the system, which also take into account any trust relationships that might affect the security of the system. However, up to now, the current state of the art does not provide modelling languages and methodologies to assist developers to consider security and trust when they develop information systems. This statement provides the main motivation behind our work. Our goal is to provide such languages and methodologies.
In this paper we describe how the integration of two prominent software engineering approaches, one that provides a securityoriented process (Mouratidis, 2004; Mouratidis, 2005) and one that provides a trust management process (Giorgini, 2004; Giorgini, 2005a; Giorgini, 2005b; Giorgini, 2005d) results in the development of a methodology that considers security and trust issues as part of its development process. Such integration represents an advance over the current state of the art by providing the first effort to consider security and trust issues under a single software engineering methodology.
The chapter is structured as follows. Next section provides an overview of the Tropos methodology and discusses the issues of using the Tropos methodology for modelling security concerns. The following section describes the Secure Tropos concepts and modelling activities, whereas the next section presents the revised Secure Tropos process. The two subsequent sections discuss the formalisation of the Secure Tropos concepts and present an application of the Secure Tropos methodology to a case study from the health care domain. The last two sections present related work and conclude the chapter.
BACKGROUND ON TROPOS
Tropos is a software development methodology tailored to describe both the organisational environment of a system and the system itself (Bresciani, 2004a) . Tropos adopts the i* modelling framework (Yu, 1996) , which uses the concepts of actors, goals, tasks, resources and social dependencies for defining the obligations of actors (dependees) to other actors (dependers).
Models in Tropos are acquired as instances of a conceptual metamodel resting on the following concepts/relationships (Bresciani, 2004a; Yu, 1996) . An Actor models an entity that has strategic goals and intentionality within the system or the organizational setting. An actor represents a physical or a software agent as well as a role or position (Yu, 1996) . A Goal represents actors' strategic interests. We distinguish hard goals from softgoals, the second having no clearcut definition and/or criteria for decide whether they are satisfied or not. Softgoals are typically used to model nonfunctional requirements. A Plan (also known as task) represents, at an abstract level, a way of doing something. The execution of a plan can be a means for satisfying a goal or for satisficing a softgoal. A Resource represents a physical or an informational entity. The main difference with an agent is that a resource has not intentionality. A Dependency between two actors indicates that one actor depends, for some reason, on another in order to attain some goal, execute some plan, or deliver a resource. The former actor is called the depender, while the latter is called the dependee. The object around which the dependency centres is called the dependum. To assist developers in the development of information systems, Tropos covers four main software development phases (Bresciani, 2004a) . Early Requirements, concerned with the understanding of a problem by studying an existing organisational setting. The output of this phase is an organisational model, which includes relevant actors, their respective dependencies and the security constraints imposed to those actors. Late requirements, where the systemtobe is described within its operational environment, along with relevant functions; this description models the system as a (small) number of actors, which have a number of dependencies. These dependencies define the system's functional requirements. Architectural design, where the system's global architecture is defined in terms of subsystems, interconnected through data and control flows. Within the framework, subsystems are represented as actors and data/control interconnections are represented as (system) actor dependencies. Detailed design, where each architectural component is defined in further detail in terms of inputs, outputs, and control. For this stage, Tropos is using elements of the Agent UML (Bauer, 2001 ) to complement the features of i*.
To compliment the above development stages, the original Tropos methodology proposes the following modelling activities (Bresciani, 2004a) . Actor modelling, which consists of identifying and analyzing both the actors of the environment and the system's actors and agents. Dependency modelling, which consists of identifying actors which depend on one another for goals to be achieved, plans to be performed, and resources to be furnished. A graphical representation of the model obtained following the above modelling activities is given through actor diagrams, which describe the actors (depicted as circles), their goals (depicted as ovals), their softgoals (depicted as cloud shapes) and the network of dependency relationships among actors (two arrowed lines connected by a graphical symbol varying according to the dependum: a goal, a plan or a resource).
Goal and plan modelling rests on the analysis of an actor goals, conducted from the point of view of the actor, by using three basic reasoning techniques: meansend analysis, contribution analysis, and AND/OR decomposition (Mouratidis, 2004) . A graphical representation of goal and plan modelling is given through goal diagrams, which appears as a balloon within which goals of a specific actor are analyzed and dependencies with other actors are established. Goals are decomposed into subgoals and positive/negative contributions of subgoals to goals are specified.
Goal decomposition can be closed through a meansend analysis aimed at identifying plans, resources and softgoals that provide means for achieving the goal.
Original Tropos (Bresciani, 2004a) fails, however, to adequately capture security requirements (Mouratidis, 2004; Mouratidis, 2005) . The process of integrating security and functional requirements throughout the whole range of the development stages is quite ad hoc, and in addition, the concept of softgoal that Tropos uses to capture security requirements fails to adequately capture some constraints that security requirements often represent (Mouratidis, 2004) .
Moreover, the methodology fails to provide concepts and processes to model trust relationships (Giorgini, 2004) .
To overcome these limitations, two lines of work have initiated. On one hand, an initial modification of Tropos methodology (called Secure Tropos) to enable it to model security concerns throughout the whole software development process has been proposed (Bresciani, 2004b; Mouratidis, 2003; Mouratidis, 2004; Mouratidis, 2005) . In particular this extension proposes the use of security constraints and secure capabilities as basic concepts to be used for the integration of security concerns, in a structured and well defined manner, throughout all the phases of the software development process. On the other hand, a different extension has been proposed in (Giorgini, 2004; Giorgini, 2005a; Giorgini, 2005b; Giorgini, 2005d ) (also called Secure Tropos), which introduces concepts such as ownership, trust, and delegation within a normal functional requirements model. The key idea here is the separation of the notion of offering a service and ownership of the very same service, as well as the distinction of functional dependency and trust dependency.
Both of these approaches have been found useful when considering security and trust during the development of information systems. However, they illustrate some limitations. Firstly, the identification of the security constraints depends mostly on the dependencies between the actors. However, the process does not take into account any trust relationships that might exist between these actors. Such trust relationships might lead to the identification of security constraints which cannot be identified otherwise. Moreover, the analysis of the trust and delegation relationships results in a high level description. However, the approach lacks a well defined process to transform such high level description to a lower level description and in turn implementation.
We believe that such limitations can be overcome by integrating the two approaches. The main challenge here is the redefinition of the existing process to accommodate the new modelling activities as well as the integration of the concepts introduced by the two approaches on the same process in a clear and distinguished way.
THE SECURE TROPOS CONCEPTS AND MODELLING ACTIVITIES
Secure Tropos extends the original Tropos methodology with some new concepts (Bresciani, 2004b; Mouratidis, 2003; Mouratidis, 2004; Mouratidis, 2005; Giorgini, 2004; Giorgini, 2005a; Giorgini, 2005b; Giorgini, 2005d) . A Security Constraint represents, generally speaking, constraints that are related to the security of the system. A security constraint is defined as a restriction related to security issues, such as privacy, integrity and availability, which can influence the analysis and design of a multiagent system under development by restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting with some of the requirements of the system, or by refining some of the system's objectives. Secure Entities represent any secure goals/tasks/resources of the system. A secure goal represents the strategic interests of an actor with respect to security. Secure goals are mainly introduced in order to achieve possible security constraints that are imposed to an actor or exist in the system. However, a secure goal does not particularly define how the security constraints can be achieved, since alternatives can be considered. The precise definition of how the secure goal can be achieved is given by a secure task. A secure task is defined as a task that represents a particular way for satisfying a secure goal. A secure resource can be defined as an informational entity that is related to the security of the multiagent system. Secure resources can be divided into two main categories.
Those that display some security characteristics, imposed by other entities, such as security constraints, secure goals, secure tasks and secure dependencies. Ownership, which indicates that an actor is the legitimate owner of a goal, a plan, or a resource. Owners have full authority concerning the achievement of their goals, execution of their plans, or use of their resources. Additionally, they can delegate their authority to other actors. Provisioning, which indicates that an actor has the capability to achieve a goal, execute a plan, or deliver a resource. Trust of permission between two actors indicates that an actor, called truster, believes that other actor, called trustee, will not misuse a permission to achieve a goal, execute a plan or provide a resource. In these cases trust is centred on an object, which is called the trustum. In general, by trusting another actor in relation to a trustum, an actor assumes that the trustum is properly used. Trust of execution between two actors indicates the belief of one truster that a trustee is able to achieve a goal, execute a plan, or deliver a resource. In general, by trusting another actor in relation to a trustum, an actor assumes that the trustum will be delivered. Delegation of permission between two actors indicates that one actor, called delegater, delegates to the other actor, called delegatee, the permission to achieve a goal, execute a plan, or use a resource. In these cases delegation is centred on an object that is called the delegatum. In general, delegation is used to model a formal passage in the domain. This would be matched by the issuance of a delegation certificate such as digital credential or a letter. Delegation of execution between two actors indicates that one delegater delegates to a delegatee the achievement of a goal or execution of a plan. This would be matched by a call to an external procedure. When the delegatum is a resource, delegation of execution means that the delegater requests the resource to the delegatee. Secure Trust of Permission (Execution)
represents that a trust relation between two actors involves the introduction of a security constraint that must be satisfied either by the truster, the trustee or both for the trust relation to be valid. Secure trust relations are categorized into truster secure trust relation, in which the truster introduces security constraints for the trust relation and the trustee must satisfy the security constraints for the trust relation to be valid, trustee secure trust relation, in which the trustee introduces security constraints and the truster must satisfy them, and double secure trust relation, in which both the truster and the trustee introduce security constraints for the trust relation that both must satisfy for the trust relation to be valid. Secure Delegation of Permission (Execution) represents that a delegation between two actors involves the introduction of a security constraint that must be satisfied either by the delegater, the delegatee or both for the delegation to be valid. Secure delegations are categorized into delegater secure delegation, in which the delegater introduces security constraints for the delegation and the delegatee must satisfy the security constraints for the delegation to be valid, delegatee secure delegation, in which the delegatee introduces security constraints and the delegatee must satisfy them, and double secure delegation, in which both the delegater and the delegatee introduce security constraints for the delegation that both must satisfy for the delegation to be valid.
Moreover, the following modelling activities extend the current activities of the Tropos methodology to allow the modelling of security and trust.
• Trust of permission modelling consists of identifying actors which trust other actors for goal, plans, and resources, and actors which own goal, plans, and resources. In particular, in the early requirement phase, it focuses on modelling trust relations between social actors of the organizational setting. New trust relations are elicited and added to the model upon the refinement activities discussed above. During late requirements analysis, trust modelling focuses on analyzing the trust relations of the systemtobe actor.
• Delegation of permission modelling consists of identifying actors which delegate to other actors the permission on goals, plans, and resources. In particular, in the early requirement phase, it focuses on modelling delegations between social actors of the organizational setting. New delegations are elicited and added to the model upon the refinement activities discussed above. During late requirements analysis, delegation modelling focuses on analyzing the delegations involving the systemtobe actor.
It is worth mentioning that Trust of execution modelling and delegation of execution modelling follow the same principles as the above modelling activities. Moreover, a graphical representation of the models obtained following the above modelling activities is given through four different kinds of actor diagrams: permission trust model, execution trust model, functional requirements model and trust management implementation. Essentially, the first two models represent the trust network among the actors involved in the system, the third represents which obligations are effectively delegated by actors and which actors are responsible for such obligations, and the last represents which permission are effectively delegated by actors and which actors receive such permissions. These models use the same notation for actors, goals, plans and resource used during dependency modelling.
• The security constraint modelling consists of modelling security constraints imposed to the actors and the system, and it allows developers to perform an analysis by introducing relationships between the security constraints or a security constraint and its context. Security constraint modelling is divided into a number of smaller modelling activities such as security constraint delegation, in which a delegation of a security constraint from one actor to another is modelled, security constraint assignment, in which the assignment of a security constraint to a goal is modelled, and security constraint analysis, which consists of decomposing security constraints and also identifying secure goals that security constraints might introduce to the system.
• Secure entities modelling consists of identifying secure tasks and resources that provide means for achieving a secure goal; identifying secure goals that contribute positively or negatively to the secure goal being analysed; and decomposing secure goals and/or tasks into subgoals and subtasks respectively. Secure Entities modelling is considered complementary to the security constraints modelling, and it follows the same reasoning techniques, such as meansend, contribution and decomposition analysis, that Tropos employs for goal and task analysis.
A graphical representation of the above modelling activities is given through actor and goal diagrams. Essentially, the security related modelling activities are combined with the Tropos's other modelling activities. It depends on the designer to decide which activity must be employed at which stage of the system development, since the main aim of these activities is not to restrict the designer to a stepbystep development of the systemtobe, but rather to provide a framework that allows the developer to go from a high level design to a more precise and defined version of the system.
THE SECURE TROPOS PROCESS
As mentioned above, one of the main challenges of the integration was to revise the Tropos process in order to accommodate the newly introduced modelling activities in a structured and useful manner.
The previous sections introduced the security and trust concepts supported by the proposed approach. This section focuses on the generic security process from which the models are constructed. The overall methodological process for secure Tropos is an iterative process in which the above presented modelling activities are used to produce different kinds of actor and goal diagrams. The diagrams produced in one activity are used as input for the other activities. In general, the process begins with a set of actors, each with an associated list of goals, together with a definition of any dependencies between them. Trust and delegation relationships are then defined together with any security constraints that might restrict the actors.
In particular, during the early requirements analysis stage, the analysis starts with the actor modelling activity, in which the relevant stakeholders of the system's environment, together with their goals, are identified and modelled. An actor diagram is produced initially, which is refined after subsequent analysis. Initially, this diagram is extended to model the dependencies of the actors, including the trust and delegation relationships. This latter activity will produce a more refined version of the actor diagram in terms of trust and delegation diagrams, where trust and ownership relationships are analyzed along with the delegations for permission and execution among the actors. Then, a third modelling activity (Security Constraint modelling) will further enhance the analysis by identifying and modelling the security constraints of the involved actors.
For each dependency modelled during the previous step of the process, a trust analysis takes place by following the trust modelling activities described earlier. When a resource dependency is concerned, the ownership of the resource must be defined together with the trust relationship.
Then, goal/plan modelling activities are used to analyse the goals/plans of each actor on the base of the analysis that took place during the previous activities. The resulting model identifies all the possible goals of each actor together with the plans to satisfy these goals. Moreover, secure entities modelling is used to further analyse all the security constraints of each actor, together with any possible secure goals, tasks and/or resources.
It is worth mentioning that the analysis process and the application of the modelling activities is quite iterative, meaning that various iterations of the actor diagram will take place before the final one is produced. Moreover, each modelling activity might generate further analysis. For instance, new actors might be discovered during the delegation modelling. This will start a new iteration of analysis (starting from the actor modelling) aiming to preserve consistency during the produced models. Figure 2 shows the process of the early requirements phase. The Late Requirements Analysis stage employs the same modelling activities as the early requirements analysis stage. The main difference is that whereas in the early requirements analysis the environment of the system is modelled, during the late requirements analysis we model the systemtobe. The system is introduced into the analysis as an actor, which has a number of goals. Initially, the dependency modelling drives us to model, as subsequent activity, the dependencies between the existing actors and the system. These dependencies allow us to identify the system requirements. Trust, delegation and security constraints modelling result in revised versions of the actor diagram. Then, the goals/plans and secure entities of the systemto be are identified and modelled with the help of goal/plan and secure entities modelling. Similarly to the early requirements analysis stage, this is an iterative process that can require various revisions of the dependency models and goal/plan analysis.
The Architectural design stage starts with the identification of the overall system architecture.
Selecting the system architecture consists of selecting among alternative architectural styles using as criteria the security requirements of the system. An independent probabilistic model is employed, which uses the measure of satisfiability proposed by Giorgini (2002) , to represents the probability that the security requirement will be satisfied. Therefore, the activity results in contribution relationships from possible architectural styles to the probability of satisfying the security requirements of the system. After this, the process continues decomposing the system in subcomponents (subactor) and delegating them goals and responsibilities accordingly with the selected architecture and the dependency model resulting from the previous phase. Each subactor is further analysed along its goals and plans. Figure 3 shows the resulting process. 
SECURE TROPOS CONCEPTS FORMALISATION
In order to automatically verify the correctness and consistency of functional and security requirements, we provide a formalization, based on Datalog (Abiteboul, 1995) , of the above Secure Tropos concepts.
The formalization is based on the predicates presented in Figure 4 . To make the predicates as generic as possible, we use the first argument of the predicates as a type parameter. Other predicates define properties that will be used during formal analysis. The predicates delegateChain (exec,a,b,s) and trustChain (exec,a,b,s) hold if there is a delegation and a trust chain respectively, between actor a and actor b. The predicates delegateChain (perm,a,b,s) and trustChain (perm,a,b,s) are the dual of their execution counterpart. The predicate should_do (a,s) identifies actors who can directly fulfill a service. The predicate confident(exec,a,s) holds if actor a is confident that service s will be fulfilled. The predicate has_per(a,s) holds if actor a has enough right to access service s. The owner is confident that the permission that he has delegated will not be misused. In other words, an owner is confident, if there is no likely misuse of his permission. It can be seen that there is an intrinsic double negation in the statement. Thus we introduce a predicate diffident (a,s) to model this notion. At any point of delegation of permission, the delegating agent is diffident, if the delegation is being done to an agent who is not trusted or if the delegatee could be diffident himself. In this way, confident(owner,a,s) holds if owner a is confident to give the permission on service s only to trusted actors. Finally, we have predicates for goal/task refinement and resource decomposition.
Once the requirements engineer has drawn up the model, we are ready for the formal analysis. The first batch of axioms (see Figure 5 ) deals with delegation and trust: Ax1 and Ax2 are used to build delegation chains, while Ax3 and Ax4 build trust chains. These axioms hold for both execution and permission. Ax5 and Ax6 propagate trust chains with respect goal refinement.
According to Ax5 trust of execution flows topdown with respect to service decomposition, while according to Ax6 trust of permission flows bottomup respect to service decomposition.
Axioms for delegation and trust

Ax1 delegateChain(T,A,B,S) : delegate(T,A,B,S)
Ax2 delegateChain(T,A,C,S) : delegate(T,A, B,S), delegateChain(T,B,C,S)
Ax3 trustChain(T,A,B,S) : trust(T,A,B,S)
Ax4 trustChain(T,A,C,S) : trust(T, A,B,S), trustChain(T,B,C,S)
Ax5 trustChain(exec,A,B,S') : subgoal(S,S'), trustChain(exec,A,B,S)
Ax6 trustChain(perm,A,B,S') : subgoal(S',S), trustChain(exec,A,B,S)
Axioms for execution
Ax7 should_do(A,S) : delegateChain(exec,B,A,S), provides(A,S)
Ax8 should_do(A,S) : requests(A,S),provides(A,S)
Ax9 confident(satisfy,A,S) : should_do(A,S)
Ax10 confident(satisfy,A,S) : delegateChain(exec,A,B,S), trustChain(exec,A,B,S), confident(satisfy,B,S)
Ax11 confident(satisfy,A,S) : OR subgoal(S',S), confident(satisfy,A, S')
Ax12 confident(satisfy,A,S) : AND_decomp(S, S',S''), confident(satisfy,A,S'), confident(satisfy,A,S'')
Axioms for permission
Ax13 has_per(A,S) : owns(A,S)
Ax14 has_per(A,S) : delegateChain(perm,B,A,S), has per(B,S)
Ax15 has_per(A,S') : subgoal(S',S), has_per(A,S)
Ax16 confident(owner,A,S) : owns(A,S), not diffident(A,S)
Ax17 diffident(A,S) : delegateChain(perm,A,B,S), diffident(B,S)
Ax18 diffident(A,S) : delegateChain(perm,A,B,S), not trustChain(perm,A,B,S)
Ax19 diffident(A,S) : subgoal(S',S), diffident(A,S')
Axioms for execution and permission
Ax20 confident(exec,A,S) : should_do(A, S), has_per(A,S)
Ax21 confident(exec,A,S) : delegateChain(exec,A,B,S), trustChain(exec,A,B,S), confident(exec,B,S)
Ax22 confident(exec,A,S) : OR_subgoal(S',S), confident(exec,A,S')
Ax23 confident(exec,A,S) : AND_decomp(S,S',S''), confident(exec,A,S'), confident(exec,A,S'')
Figure 5: Secure Tropos axioms
The second batch of axioms is specific for execution. Ax7 and Ax8 state that an actor has to execute the service if he provides a service and if either some actor delegates the service to him, or he himself aims for the service. Ax912 captures the notion of confidence of satisfy. An actor is confident that a service will be satisfied if he knows that all delegations have been done to trusted actors. Axioms Ax11 and Ax12 define how confidence is propagated upwards along goal refinement. Next we present axioms specific for permission. The owner of a service has full authority concerning access and disposition of it. Thus, Ax13 states that if an actor owns a service, he has it. Ax14 states that if an actor has permission on a service and delegates it to another actor, the delegatee has permission on the service. The notion of confidence and diffidence is captured by the axioms Ax1519. Last batch of axioms combines execution with permission. Ax2023 define the notion of confidence of execution. Ax20 and Ax21 state that an actor is confident if he knows that all delegations have been done to trusted actors and that the actors who will ultimately execute the service, have permission to do so. Ax2223 deal with goal refinement.
Properties (see Figure 6 ) are different from axioms: they are constraints that must be checked. If the set of constraints cannot all be simultaneously satisfied, the system is inconsistent, and consequently it is not secure. We use the A ⇒ ? B to mean that one must check that each time A holds, it is desirable that B also holds. In Datalog properties can be represented as the constraint :
A, not B.
Pro1 delegateChain(T,A,B,S) ⇒ ? trustChain(T,A,B,S)
Pro2
requests(A,S) ⇒ ? confident(satisfy,A,S)
Pro3
owns(A,S) ⇒ ? confident(owner,A,S)
Pro4
requests(A,S) ⇒ ? confident(exec,A,S)
Pro5 delegateChain(perm,A,B,S) ⇒ ? has_per(A,S)
Pro6
should_do(A,S) ⇒ ? not delegateChain(exec,A,B,S)
Pro7
owns(A,S) ⇒ ? not delegateChain(perm,B,A,S), A ≠ B
Figure 6: Secure Tropos properties
Pro1 states that if an actor delegates a service to another actor, the delegater must trust the delegatee. Pro2 states that a requester wants to be confident to satisfy the desired service.
Pro3 states that the owner of the service has to be confident to delegate permission on his services only to trusted actors. Pro4 states that the requester has to be confident to see the service fulfilled. Pro5 states that an actor must be entitled to access a service in order to delegate it. Pro6 states that if an actor provides a service and if either some actor delegates this service to him or he himself requests the service, then he has to execute the service without further delegation. Finally, Pro7 states that a service cannot be delegated back to its owner.
On the other hand, security constraints are modeled by logical formulas. In particular, they can be implemented as rules and/or integrity constraints. Essentially, secure relations are defined as Datalog rules where the body represents the constraint and the head represents the relations.
However, rules could be not sufficient, and so we introduce integrity constraints that should be verified in the model. Essentially, such constraints have the form of properties. Since security constraints may requires specific domain predicates, we will present them during the analysis of the case study.
One of the important issues is the verification of the security requirements. For this reason, we have developed the Secure Tropos tool (STTool) (Giorgini, 2005c) . STTool is a CASE tool developed for design and verification of functional and security requirements, tailored to support the Secure Tropos methodology (see http://www.troposproject.org for more details).
A CASE STUDY
To better demonstrate the Secure Tropos process, we employ a case study from the health care trust (exec,Nurse,Patient,SupportPatientTreatment) trust (exec,GeneralPractitioner,Nurse,ProvidePrimaryCare) trust (exec,DepartmentOfHealth,GeneralPractitioner,ProvideHealthServices) trust (perm,DepartmentOfHealth,HealthResearchAgency,ClinicalData) owns(DepartmentOfHealth,ClinicalData)
Figure 9: Datalog Specification derived by trust analysis
On the other hand, delegation relationships can also be analysed. For example, the Department of Health not only depends on the General Practitioner to achieve the goal Provide Health Services but also delegates the responsibility to execute this goal to the General Practitioner actor. Similarly, for the Patient to achieve his/her Get Well goal, appropriate infrastructure must be in place.
However, the Patient actor cannot on their own Provide Health Infrastructure. Therefore the Patient actor delegates the responsibility for the achievement of this goal to the Department of Health.
Moreover, security constraint modelling takes place. For our case study, an environment security constraint (Mouratidis, 2004) : has_per(HealthResearchAgency,PPII) Figure 10 illustrates the diagram derived through delegation modelling and Figure 11 shows the Datalog specification representing such diagram. delegate (exec,Patient,DepatmentOfHealth,ProvideHealthInfrastructure) delegate (exec,Nurse,Patient,SupportPatientTreatment) delegate (exec,GeneralPractitioner,Nurse,ProvidePrimaryCare) delegate (exec,DepartmentOfHealth,GeneralPractitioner,ProvideHealthServices) Figure 11: Datalog specification derived from delegation analysis However, at this point the analysis does not provide an accurate understanding of the (secure) trust/delegation relationships among actors. This is due to the fact that the modelled social relations are based on high level goals for the actors, which need to be further defined. Therefore, the next step involves the goal/plan modelling in which each actor is internally analysed. Due to lack of space we do not present the complete internal analysis of the actors of our case study. but rather on one aspect necessary for the satisfaction of this goal, which is to obtain the patient's personal information. Therefore, the dependency between the Nurse and the Patient has been revised to indicate the output of the Nurse's internal analysis. Figure 12 illustrates the refined dependency model as resulted after the internal analysis of the actors of the case study.
Moreover, the internal analysis helps developers to identify new dependencies. For instance, the patient's analysis indicated that the Patient actor depends on the General Practitioner for providing them with a care plan that they need to follow in order to achieve their main goal Get Well. On the other hand, the formal analysis of the delegation relationships allows us to further define the security constraints. From the model we can see that every agent who plays the role Nurse is entitled to access patient information. Ideally, we would authorize only the nurses assigned to the patient to access patient data. Therefore, Medical Administrator enforces nurses to access information only about patient that are assigned to them as shown in Figure   2 16. Further, the patient requires their personal information to remain confidential and therefore he/she imposes an 2 It is worth mentioning that in this figure we have only modelled the security constrains together with the actors that have been affected by them (either imposed them or imposed to them).
additional security constraint to the Nurse actor. These constraints can be formally implemented as follows.
delegate (perm,Pat,Nurse,PerData) : isNurseOf(Nurse,Pat), confident(owner,Pat,PerData) .
where predicate isNurseOf (a,b) holds if a is the nurse of b.
Late requirements analysis
During the late requirements analysis, the systemtobe is introduced as another actor on the existing models. This results in redefining some of the dependencies and delegating some goals, tasks, and resources from existing actors to the newly introduced actor (the system). For instance, although during the early requirement analysis we have identified that the General Practitioner actor depends on the Medical Administrator for the Patient History resource, the internal analysis of the General Practitioner has indicated that the delegation of the responsibility of satisfying this dependency to an electronic system will result in the General Practitioner working more efficiently, with less effort and faster. Therefore, the Patient History resource dependency has been re assigned to the eHealth system actor. Similar conclusions were also drawn for other dependencies, which subsequently were assigned to the eHealth system actor as shown in Figure 16 . eHealth System. Essentially, this actor delegates the permission on patient history and patient record to General Practitioner and Medical Administration, respectively. Unfortunately, the requirements do not specify how eHealth System is entitled to access patient data.
The above inconsistencies are mainly the result of modelling mistakes of the developers, and as such they were easily corrected. However, inconsistencies might also be present due to lack of accurate requirements. When the analysis spots an inconsistency, system designers should interact with stakeholders in order to define more accurate requirements, if it is needed, and then revise the model representing the system. This process should continue until there are no more inconsistency in the model.
RELATED WORK
Our work is not the only one considering security as part of the development process. In fact, our work is related with work widely available in the literature, such as (Liu, 2002; Jürgens, 2004 , McDermott, 1999 , Sindre, 2005 , as well as with the approaches presented in the other chapters of this book. However, most of these approaches only guide the way security can be handled within a certain stage of the software development process. For example, the work by Liu et al. (2002) (chapter 10) take place in a fairly low level and it is suited to a more operational analysis.
On the other hand, Falcone (1998) argue about the importance of considering trust and provide a definition of trust in agent systems both as a mental state and a social attitude. Moreover, Jøsang
(1997) provides a formal model for reasoning about trust in information security. In this approach, trust is a belief and the presented model represents beliefs and a set of operations to combine beliefs. Trust Management is an approach to manage distributed access control combining policies, digital signatures, and logical deduction. Trust Management systems were developed as an answer to the inadequacy of traditional authorization mechanisms such as PGP and X.509.
Over the last ten years, a number of frameworks have been developed for addressing this issue.
PolicyMaker (Blaze, 1996) and KeyNote (Blaze, 1999) are essentially query engines with the aim to verify whether a required action complies system policies. DeTreville (2002) introduces Binder, a language based on wellknow logicbased languages improved with the ability to model security statements in distributed systems. Another solution based on logic programming is the RT framework (Li, 2002) , a family of Rolebased Trustmanagement languages designed for representing policies and credential in distributed systems. RT takes the notion of role and the assignment of permissions to roles from RBAC (Sandhu, 1996) , and the management of distributed authorities through the use of credentials from Trust Management approach. Similarly, Freudnthal (2002) introduce Distributed Role Based Access Control (dRBAC), a decentralized trust management system, which provides an access control mechanism for manging distributed authorities. However, there is a gap between these frameworks and the requirements analysis process.
A first proposal for introducing trust concerns during the system development process is given by Yu (2001) . They model trust using the i* framework. Their approach models intentional dependency relationships among strategic actors and their rationales. As actors depend on each other for goals to be achieved, tasks to be performed, and resources to be furnished, the trust relationships among these actors are considered using the concept of softgoal.
All the above mentioned approaches differentiate between security and trust. In other words, these approaches mostly consider security and trust as two separate concepts and do not provide a complete framework to consider both of them at the same time. As it was argued earlier on this paper, security and all the related concepts, such as trust, should be considered under a single software engineering methodology. It is only then, that we will be able to fully integrated security considerations in the development stages of software systems, resulting in the development of more secure systems.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has introduced the integration of two prominent Troposbased approaches, which deal with security and trust issues in the development of information systems. The result is the first ever methodology to consider both security and trust as part of the software development process.
During the course of our work, we have identified a number of important advantages that resulted as part of the integration. These are:
• The trust and delegation relationships are further analysed in terms of security constraints which are then converted to operationalised goal which are easy to implement. In other words, an initially abstract analysis can be converted to a more precise and detailed specification.
• Security constraints identification is more precise and it is based on a well defined analysis around the trust and the delegations demonstrated by one actor to another.
• Able to model trust, delegation and security simultaneously with one analysis compliment the other but in the same time maintain the separation of each concept.
• Security constraints are imposed either by the environment or the actor that has ownership of the dependum. Therefore, the ownership analysis performed as part of the trust modelling allows developers to easier identify the security constraints.
Our work is not complete. We are currently working on applying our approach to more case studies, in order to further validate our framework, as well as enhancing our methodology by introducing other concepts related to security.
